• Phasing out Russian gas is technically and physically feasible even during major global supply shocks, as missing volumes can be successfully replaced through a combination of storage withdrawals and alternative LNG imports.
• Maintaining Russian gas supplies has nearly no measurable effect on costs (1-3%) in most crisis scenarios. So there is no economic or technical necessity to postpone the phaseout.
• Europe’s primary energy vulnerability has shifted from a dependence on Russian pipeline gas to a heavy reliance on US LNG, which in some scenarios results in a market share similar to Russia's levels prior to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
• A 3-months drop of US LNG alone results in a 50% gas bill increase for European buyers. This risk points to the high dependence on US LNG and the potential weaponization of US supplies.
• The closure of the Strait of Hormuz could increase the EU’s gas bill by 48%, while a simultaneous 3-months loss of US LNG supply could drive that increase as high as 106%.
• The most effective response to neutralize severe price hikes is to reduce gas demand by 25% within the next 2 years.

In 2021, Russia started to constrain its natural gas sales to Europe. Following the February 2022 full-scale invasion of
Russia in Ukraine, pipeline gas deliveries were either unilaterally stopped by Russia, or terminated by European buyers. As
of 2025, Russian pipeline gas and LNG which provided 43% of imports to the EU27 dropped to 12%. This tremendous shift in
the supply structure of Europe was made possible by a set of phenomena and measures, such as the price hikes of 2022-
2023 which triggered a 20% demand response in Europe, as well as increased LNG supplies from the US (from 6% in 2021
to 26% in 2025). By 2025, a new gas market equilibrium was set in Europe, with lower gas consumption, somewhat higher
gas prices and some Russian gas still imported to European consumers. This new equilibrium allowed the EU to take the
political decision to phase out remaining Russian molecules without major technical difficulties or costs.

In March 2026, Israel and the United Stated launched an attack on Iran, which lead to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and missile strikes in the Ras Laffan liquefaction facility of Qatar. Consequently 20% of global LNG supply disappeared from the market, as vessels from the Persian Gulf were unable to reach global LNG markets. As majority of Qatari cargoes targeted Asia, the supply shock directly affected Asian markets, nearly doubling the price of LNG. Although below 10% of European LNG imports originated from Qatar, TTF prices also reacted by a nearly 50% increase.

Considering the current crisis in the Middle East, it is worthwhile to assess whether the Russian gas phaseout for Europe is still possible? To answer this question, three aspects must be considered:

• Is there sufficient infrastructure and alternative supplies in the global market, accounting for the current and possible realistic future supply shocks?
• If there are no technical issues, how much will the Russian gas phaseout cost for European consumers?
• Is Europe shifting from one dependency to another?
• Are the new supply sources posing another supply security risk?

The policy brief is structured as the following: First, we discuss the Strait of Hormuz crisis. Second, scenarios and underlying assumptions are introduced. Third, scenarios are compared showing the EU27 supply structure, sources of LNG and total gas procurement cost for the EU27.